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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff-Appellee,

s

v.

:

WAYNE GENE NICHOLAS,

t

Case No. 920306-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Wayne Gene Nicholas appeals his convictions
for burglary and forcible sexual abuse, both second degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 and 76-5-405
(1990).

This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Should defendant be granted a new trial solely

because of "gaps" in the trial transcript?

This presents a

question of law which, in turn, depends upon whether defendant
has demonstrated prejudice stemming from the transcription
errors.

See State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah March

11, 1992).
2.

Did the trial court err in sentencing defendant to

serve two consecutive, one-to-fifteen year terms on his two
second degree felony convictions?

Utah's appellate courts review

trial court sentencing decisions deferentially, reversing only

for clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,

192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah
App. 1991).
3.

Does appellate defense counsel's noncompliance with

the rule for filing an "Anders" brief preclude appellate review
of various other issues advanced by defendant, but which counsel
represents are unappealable?

By its terms, this is a question of

appellate policy that cannot be answered in the trial court;
hence it is reviewed de. novo on appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of this appeal will be
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was found guilty, upon jury trial, of
burglary and forcible sexual abuse, both second degree felonies
(R. 75-76).

Following a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation by the

Department of Corrections, the trial court sentenced defendant to
two consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms at the Utah State
Prison (R. 91-93).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Evidence Supporting the Guilty Verdicts
At trial, defendant was identified by Peggy Williams
and her daughter, Tonya, as the person who intruded into their
St. George, Utah home at approximately 5:30 on a September
morning, and awakened Tonya by sexually "fondling" her (T.
2

12/17/91 at 41, 72). Tonya recognized defendant because he had
been in her home roughly two months earlier, in the company of
one of Tonya's friends; soon after that meeting, defendant had
made a return visit, speaking briefly to Tonya (id. at 38-40).
During the September intrusion, Peggy Williams was
awakened by Tonya's screams (T. 12/17/91 at 66). Tonya turned on
the lights in the home, enabling Peggy to get a good look at the
intruder (id. at 66-67).

Further, the intruder complied in

unhurried, seemingly casual fashion when Peggy demanded that he
leave the premises (jLd. at 40-42, 68, 73). Thus at trial, Peggy
Williams was also able to confidently identify defendant as the
intruder (id. at 71-72).
Sentencing Decision
Following defendant's ninety-day diagnostic evaluation,
the Department of Corrections filed a presentence report, which
became part of the record on appeal (Record Index at 2). This
sealed report has not been released by this Court to the State's
appellate counsel; a motion for such release is pending as this
brief is being prepared.
However, the transcript of defendant's sentencing
hearing reflects that defense counsel reviewed the presentence
report and spoke to one of the individuals involved in preparing
it (T. 4/15/92 at 2; full transcript at Appendix I of this
brief).

The presentence report apparently made no recommendation

on concurrent versus consecutive sentencing (id. at 9). However,
according to the prosecutor, and not contested by defense
3

counsel, defendant has a lengthy criminal record (id. at 7). It
was reported that defendant had threatened Peggy or Tonya
Williams while in jail following trial (id.).

It further

appeared that during his ninety-day evaluation, defendant had
been placed in Mlock down" due to troublesome behavior (id.).
The trial court also found defendant's behavior in the
courtroom—laughing during a matter preceding his sentencing
hearing—to be unacceptable (id. at 8-9). Subsequently, in its
written judgment, sentence, and commitment, the trial court
specifically found that defendant "is unable to control his
impulses and constitutes a serious danger to the people of the
state of Utah, and therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that COUNT II [forcible sexual abuse] shall be served
consecutively with COUNT I [burglary]" (R. 92).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant cannot receive a new trial solely because of
transcription errors or "gaps" in the original trial transcript.
Such errors must be prejudicial in order to warrant a new trial.
Defendant has made no showing of prejudice; further, he has
failed to take measures, set forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedures, to cure the transcript problems.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant.

He received a statutorily permitted

sentence, and the decision to sentence him consecutively for his
two offenses was supported by information presented to the court.

4

Even if the trial court's sentencing decision was related in poit
to defendant's courtroom conduct, it was proper.
Defendant's appellate counsel has not met the
requirements for filing an "Anders" brief with regard to the
other issues identified on appeal.

Counsel has not moved to

withdraw from representing defendant; instead, he has advanced
those issues that he identifies as bavlnq some meril.
Accordingly, this Court need not review the other issues not
analyzed by defense counsel.

Further, it appears that those

issues dip indeed roexiLless.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PROBLEMS WITH THE TRANSCRIPTION OF HIS TRIAL
DO NOT, BY THEMSELVES, REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT
RECEIVE A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant's trial was recorded on audiotape, rather
than by a 1 * cuui t iepoit£ij

Subsequently! the transcriber

found that the trial audiotape contained inaudible sections and
outright "gaps," caused by inoperable microphones and the failure
at one point to have the recording equipment switched on
(Certified Transcriber's Report, Exh. A to Br. of Appellant).
Such transcription problems are unfortunate, and trial
courts should make every effort to prevent them.
themselves, they do not compel a new trial.

However, by

Instead, as the Utah

Supreme Court has made clear, a new trial is required only when
errors in transcribing the original trial are prejudicial

State

v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (March 11, 1992) (following
5

"clear weight of authority").

To be prejudicial, transcription

errors or omissions must prevent review of substantive issues a
party wishes to pursue on appeal, id.
Defendant makes no showing that transcription problems
in this case prevent appellate review of any substantive issues.
In Exhibit "B" of his brief, he merely lists a number of gaps in
the trial transcript, making no effort to show how they relate to
his other issues on appeal.

The State has reviewed those

omissions at Appendix II of this brief:

they appear to be minor,

and unrelated to any substantive issue on appeal.

Thus defendant

has not met the Menzies "prejudice" requirement for a new trial.
Accord Utah R. Crinu P. 30(a) (errors not affecting "substantial
rights" "shall be disregarded").
Further, defendant has made no effort to cure the
identified transcript omissions.

Rules 11(f), -(g), and -(h),

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allow parties to complete a
deficient record on appeal, including transcript unavailability,
with an agreed statement of the evidence, approved by the trial
court.

If the parties cannot agree on the evidence, the

differences are settled by the trial court.

Defendant has not

attempted to do this, nor has he shown that this procedure could
not adequately correct the transcript omissions. Accordingly, he
cannot complain of the incomplete record now.

Emia v. Havward,

703 P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985) (failure to settle record
under former Utah R. Civ. P. 75(m) bars complaint of incomplete
record on appeal).
6

]f transcript pioblemb obst ui> evidence relevant to
substantive issues on appeal# it is the appellant's duty to
correct them.

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah

App ) , cert. denied.

lib

1 .M

H 1 (» | til *ili 1989).

Defendant has

neither shown the relevance of, nor attempted to correct, the
transcript problems in this case, and this failure works against
him on appcM I
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT.
Defendant's complaint that he should not have been
sentenced consecutively Jul the forcible sexual abuse and
burglary convictions also fails

Trial courts have broad

discretion to impose statutorily-permitted sentences.

State v,

Russell, 791 P,2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. Rhodes, 818
P.2d 1048/ 1049 (Utah App. 1991).

Consecutive sentencing is also

permitted in instances wherer as here, 1 he fame criminal ppisolc
encompasses distinct criminal acts.

State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d

843 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (affirming consecutive sentences for
aggravated kidnapping rind sexual assault wit Inn same episode).
Here the trial court was apprised of defendant's
lengthy criminal history, his apparent danger to others, and of
his poor impulse contiol, and 1 tu>k pa? in ulaj nr tn

f t he* t

considerations (R. 92). The court also expressed concern with
the "terror" defendant's crimes had inflicted upon Peggy and
Tonya Williams (1

4 ' 1 5/9> at H)

Those die

relevant sentencing

considerations under Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1051 (citing authority),
7

and clearly supported the court's decision, under the discretion
provided by Utah Code Ann- § 76-3-401(1) (1990), to sentence
defendant consecutively, rather than concurrently.
Further, it was entirely permissible for the trial
court to note defendant's courtroom behavior—which the court
took as evidence of his poor impulse control—in meting out
sentence.

In State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978), the

defendant tried to escape the courtroom during his sentencing
hearing.

The trial court then rescinded its decision, announced

just before the escape attempt, to order a ninety-day presentence
evaluation; instead, it imposed sentence. .Id. at 886.

The

supreme court squarely rejected the defendant's claim that the
ninety-day evaluation should have not been rescinded:

"Whether

or not the trial judge changed his mind due to the conduct of the
defendant or to other reasons is not our concern."

JEd. at 887.

Defendant's consecutive sentences here were statutorily
permitted, and Gerrard demonstrates that he cannot assign his own
disruptive courtroom behavior as a basis for setting the trial
court's decision aside.

There was no abuse of discretion by the

trial court, and defendant's sentences should be affirmed.
POINT THREE
THE ADDITIONAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY
DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL, BUT NOT
ANALYZED IN "ANDERS" BRIEF FASHION, SHOULD
NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT.
While he has only briefed two points on appeal, defense
counsel identifies four other issues:

sufficiency of the

evidence on each of the two guilty verdicts, a claimed "speedy

8

trial" violation,- arid ineffective assistance of counsel (Br. of
Appellant at 2).

Regarding these issues, counsel represents that

he has "made a conscientious examination of the record, such as
it i s, and i s unable to i n good faith argue any appealable
issues" (id. at 5). He requests, however, that this Court
independently examine the record for reversible error, citing
Anders v.

C a iif o r n j a y

335 y # s # 738 f 87 S

Ct

1396 (1967 ) . Thi s

is unnecessary.
Anders provides the means whereby counsel can withdraw

the appeal is frivolous,

in State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah

1981), the Utah Supreme Court adopted and spelled out the process
of what has come to be cal led "Anders briefing,"

In essence,, the

process requires appellate counsel to accompany his or her motion
to withdraw with "a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguabl y suppoi: t the appeal," and to serve that brief
on the defendant who, in turn, is allowed to respond.
appellate court then decides the withdrawal motion.

The

Clayton, 639

P 2d at 169 70.
Here, while he has served his brief on defendant (Br.
of Appellant at 6), appellate counsel has not moved to withdraw.
Instead, he has briefed the two issues on appeal that, in his
judgment, appear to have merit.

As to the remaining issues, he

has not followed the Anders-Clayton briefing requirements.
Under these circumstances, the remaining issues
identified in the Brief of Appellant should be disregarded
9

altogether.

Appellate counsel's statement that those issues are

"unappealable" merely makes explicit that which is implicit in
any appellate brief:

counsel has advanced the most promising

issues, and discarded the hopeless ones. This is sound appellate
practice.

See Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336-37 (Utah

App. 1991), quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.
Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983) ("Experienced advocates since time out of
memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal . . . " ) .
Nor is this a death penalty case. Accordingly, this
Court need not scour the record for unbriefed errors.

Cf. State

v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah March 11, 1992).

Even

in such a case, the Utah Supreme Court has endorsed the principle
that "a reviewing court . . . is not simply a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research."

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)

(quotations and citations omitted).

Absent compliance with the

Anders-Clayton procedures, then, defense counsel cannot expect
this Court to independently seek out error.
Briefly, it also appears that the unbriefed issues
identified by defense counsel are, indeed, not worth pursuing.
As set forth in this brief's statement of facts, there is
adequate evidence supporting the guilty verdicts on burglary and
forcible sexual abuse:

defendant entered the Williams home

without invitation or authorization, and committed a felony upon
Tonya Williams.

See Utah Code Ann. (1990) SS 76-6-202 (burglary
10

is unlawful entry with intent to commit a felony); 76-5-404
(forcible sexual abuse is the taking of "indecent liberties"
without consent).
Defendant was tried for the offenses within three
months of his arrest (R. 4, 76). It does not appear that he ever
demanded a more speedy trial, even though he was informed on
October 10 of his December 17 trial date (R. 22); much longer
delays have been held acceptable.

See State v. Trafnv, 799 P.2d

704, 708 n. 16 (Utah 1990) (citing cases).
Finally, at trial, defense counsel vigorously
challenged the ability of Peggy and Tonya Williams to accurately
identify defendant as the intruder in their home (e.g., T.
12/17/91 at 48-52, 73-79).

A comprehensive precautionary

instruction about eyewitness identification testimony was given
to the jury, and stressed in closing argument (R. 63-65, T.
12/17/91 at 209-15).

Thus trial counsel performed competently.

Appellate counsel, in turn, has legitimately chosen to not pursue
an ineffective counsel claim on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial transcription problems did not prejudice
defendant, and therefore do not require a new trial.

He was

appropriately sentenced upon his convictions, which were secured
by a trial that was fairly conducted.

Accordingly, those

convictions and sentences should now be affirmed.

11

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ) day of October, 1992
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
DOUGLAS D. TERRY, attorney for defendant, 150 North 200 East,
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, this "2») day of October,
1992.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. JAMES L. SHUMATE, Judge

STATE OF UTAH,

Cut* if OftuMt <%&>£>6-&f

Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 911500095

vs.
WAYNE GENE NICHOLAS,

(Tape-Recorded Proceedings)
Pefendant-

REPORTER'S SENTENCING HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Wednesday, April 15, 1992
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the State:

W. BRENT LANGSTON, ESQ.
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

For the Defendant:

DOUGLAS D. TERRY, ESQ.
150 North 200 East
Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
P.O. BOX 1534
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 673-5315

1

ST. GEORGE, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 1992

2

-oOo-

3
4

THE COURT:

Call 911500095, State of Utah versus Wayne

5

Gene Nicholas. The record will reflect that Mr. Nicholas is

6

present, together with his counsel Mr. Terry.

7

represented by Mr. Langston.

8
9

The Court has reviewed the recommendations of the
ninety-day diagnostic unit.

10
11

The State is

I'll hear you in mitigation, Mr. Terry.
MR. TERRY:

Your Honor, I —

first of all, let me

12

preface my remarks by saying that I'm aware that the State

13

is going to ask that the Court follow the recommendation,

14

and I believe is probably going to ask for consecutive

15

sentences.

16

in this case, Your Honor.

17

I don't believe that —

that that is warranted

I spoke with Mr. Keith Smith this morning, who —

18

it's his cover letter that accompanies the recommendation

19

from the diagnostic unit.

20

about the items that are contained in the diagnostic report,

21

and I asked Mr. Smith two things.

And —

and I talked to Mr. Smith

First of all, I asked him

22 I if the recommendation would have been different absent
23

the —

the fight that Mr. Nicholas was engaged —

or was

24

involved in. And he told me yes, it probably would have

25

been.

All things being equal, had that not occurred, the

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1

recommendation probably would have not been for a prison

2

commitment.

3

And I asked him also regarding Mr. Nicholas'

4

admission and his willingness to take responsibility for

5

what happened.

6

but —

7

the diagnostic report was prepared, Mr. Nicholas, who had —

8

who had indicated throughout the evaluation period that he

9

took responsibility but could not specifically remember

And I don't know if the Court is aware,

but after —

just shortly after the recommendation

10

the —

11

the charges that he was convicted of, he did go back into

12

group and admitted —

13

his participation.

14

would —

15

equal, and he indicated that yes, it would probably have

16

made a difference.

—

the event that took place that formed the basis for

admitted his responsibility.

Admitted

And I asked Mr. Smith if that, you know,

would make a difference, all other things being

17

I talked to the victims.
And I —

They're in the courtroom

18

today.

I am going to make a proffer of what they

19

told me.

20

we could call them.

21

that.

22

indicated to me ~

23

I told them that —

24

taking full responsibility for what had happened; that he

25

harbors no —

If the State wants to cross-examine them, I guess
I know they're very nervous about

But both Tonya and her mother, Mrs. Williams,
I told them what the recommendation was.
that my client had admitted and was

no ill will whatsoever toward —

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

toward them

4
1

at this point; that he knows that it was —

2

actions —

3

they do not necessarily feel like that prison commitment is

4

either in their best interests or in the best interests of

5

society or Mr. Nicholas' best interests.

6

victims before, who are very bitter.

7

going to say whether or not the victim in this case has a

8

right to be bitter, but I'm encouraged that she is not.

9

encouraged that that is for her best interests, that she

it's his responsibility.

that it is his

And they told me that

I talked to

And ~

and I'm not

I'm

10

does not harbor bitter feelings toward Mr. Nicholas.

11

would like to see Mr. Nicholas get the help that he needs.

12

And her mother, Mrs. Williams, also indicated that to me.

13

She

And I would submit to the Court, Your Honor,

14

that ~

15

can go.

16

Mr. Nicholas to prison.

17

period of time. And I'm not sure that —

18

he will be in any better position after that experience to

19

insure that something like this or other type of criminal

20

behavior does not happen again.

21J

that I guess there's —

there's two ways the Court

The Court can follow the recommendation.

Send

He'll be out of prison after a
I'm not sure that

The other option that I would submit to the Court

22

is this. That he go into a —

a treatment program —

23

intensive in-house treatment program.

Perhaps one of the

24

halfway houses.

or Community

25

Correctiortal Center.

Ogden Correctional —
Fremont.

There are ~

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

an

there are

1

options available.

That he be incarcerated here in the

2

Washington County Jail for a period of time, and that he

3

participate in ISAT —

4

here.

go through the ISAT program while

5

And the reason that I believe that those options

6

would serve all of the interests better than just a prison

7

commitment is because I think that that is the best chance

8

that we have of Mr. Nicholas being able to —

9

learn how to conform his behavior that he has not been able

10

to do up to this point and —

11

threat to himself or to society.

12

to conform —

and in so doing, not be a

If the victims were here today, and if they were

13

pleading to the Court to throw this man in prison for —

14

as long as the Court possibly can, I probably wouldn't be

15

asking for this, Your Honor.

16

what -- that is not what they feel would be in their best

17

interests or in the — Mr. Nicholas' best interests. And

18

I —

19

to the victims. The Court has an obligation to the people

20

of the state of Utah to ~

21

again.

22

in conjunction with some incarceration —

23

been incarcerated seven months. And I think that's had an

24

impact on him.

25

talking to his prior counsel and others, I think that he's

I just think that —

But they're not.

for

That is not

that the Court has an obligation

to see that this does not happen

And I strongly feel like an intensive program in —
he's been —

he's

I didn't represent him before, but in
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1

had an attitude adjustment.

He definitely has. And I think

2

that being incarcerated for the last seven

3

has had something to do with that.

4

out why he's doing the things —

5

he's done and teach him —

6

to conform his behavior. And I would ask the Court to

7

consider something less harsh than a prison commitment.

8

Consider a treatment program in conjunction with -- with

9

additional jail time, if necessary, but to allow him to get

months has had —

But we need to figure

has done the things that

help him teach himself.

Help him

10

his problems under control so that they don't recur.

11

fearful that him going to prison will only exaggerate his

12

problems, and he will come out a bigger threat to society

13

than perhaps he is now.

14

THE COURT:

15
16

I'm

Thank you, Counsel.

Mr. Nicholas, is there anything you want to say?
MR. NICHOLAS:

Yes, sir.

I've had a lot of time to

17

analyze myself.

My life-style was pretty reckless.

18

I deserve a chance in these programs.

19

attitude problem inside, and I don't think going to jail and

20

putting me in that kind of atmosphere is going to help me

21

out any.

I know I have an

I'm sorry for the things that I've done, and I —

22 I I'm ready for a program, you know, to —
23

THE COURT: Mr. Langston?

24

MR. LANGSTON:

25

I think

to prove myself.

Your Honor, I think that the defendant's

attitude has-been amply demonstrated even in court today by
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1

his conduct over in the jury box. While the defendant has

2

been here, since he has returned from the ninety-day

3

diagnostic, he was placed in lock down because of

4

assaultive-type behavior towards one of the jailers.

5

The defendant has never demonstrated any kind of

6

remorse. And it's kind of a deathbed repentance that he's

7

talking about here today that "Well, now I'm going to accept

8

responsibility for my actions," because that's the only

9

thing he can do at this point.

10

Now, the victims, true, are saying, "We think he

11

needs help."

And I —

12

towards him.

But there were threats made through third

13

parties in the jail by the defendant towards the victim when

14

he was incarcerated after the trial.

15

they have a very commendable attitude

The defendant is a danger to society.

He has an

16

extensive criminal record.

17

down up in the state prison while he was there even for a

18

ninety-day diagnostic, when he knew that he had to be on his

19

best behavior.

20

The defendant was placed in lock

Now, if he says he wants counseling now, fine. He

21

can get it through the prison.

ISAT is available through

22

the prison if he wants that.

23

attempting to do is blackmail the Court here today by

24

saying, wIf yon send me to prison, I'm going to be worse

25

when I get out."

But in essence, what he's

And I don't think the Court should give in
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8
1

to that type of blackmail.

2

The people of the state of Utah have a right to be

3

free from fear of people like the defendant.

4

demand —

5

the Court to sentence the defendant consecutive time.

6

him up there and protect the people of the state.

7

the only way we can be safe. We can't believe anything he

8

says. And the only way to be safe from this threatening

9

type of individual —

ask —

And we would

we can't demand, but we would strongly ask
Send

That's

a person who has been engaged in

10

criminal activity such as he has —• is to put him away for

11

as long as we possibly can. As long as the statute allows.

12

His record justifies that; his behavior before and after

13 I he's been convicted justifies that.
14
15
16

And we would strongly

urge the Court to follow that recommendation.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

Rebuttal to anything, Mr. Terry?

17

MR. TERRY:

No# Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Mr. Nicholas, you are fortunate in having

19

been represented by an attorney who has taken the time to

20

discuss with the victims their feelings.

21

the Williams family and the victim, that they have recovered

22

from the terror that you have inflicted upon their lives.

23

That speaks well of them.

24

conduct does not speak well of you, sir.

25

It speaks well of

Since this offense, your own

The record should reflect that during the
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1

sentencing phase for Mr. Cannistraci earlier on the calendar

2

this morning, Mr. Nicholas, while seated in the jury box,

3

determined, for some reason known only to himself, that it

4

was appropriate to find it humorous to consider a ninety-day

5

diagnostic ~

6

or a presentence report for Mr. Cannistraci.

The fact that you were before this court looking

7

at another 30 years and cannot control your impulses enough

8

to even shut your mouth, Mr. Nicholas, does not serve you

9

well, sir.

10

The ninety-day diagnostic recommendation is for

11

commitment.

There is no recommendation as to whether or not

12

that should be for concurrent or consecutive time.

13

behavior, Mr. Nicholas, sets that recommendation, in my

14

mind.

Your

15

It's the order of the Court on Count I, burglary,

16

that you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a period

17

of time not less than one year or more than 15 years. No

18

fine is imposed.

19

Counsel, do you have a restitution figure in front

20 I of you?
21
22
23

The restitution order —

Has there been anything?

MR. LANGSTON:

I don't.

Perhaps ~

I don't know if the

probation had one in the presentence report or not.
Your Honor, the victims have informed me that they

24

haven't sought out any counseling to help them deal with

25

this; so, there are no costs associated with that.
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I
1

THE COURT: All right.

2

MR. TERRY:

3

just a moment?

No restitution order made.

Your Honor, can I interrupt the Court for

4

THE COURT: Nof Counsel.

5

MR. NICHOLAS:

I think that's the end of it.

Sir, may I —

I wasn't laughing at

6

Mr. Cannistraci. My nieces and nephews —

I haven't seen

7

them for a long timef and they were waving at me.

8

can't help if they made me laugh.

9

is in my cell with me, and I have nothing against him.

I was —

Mr. Cannistraci

10

I didn't find anything funny about this thing.

11

sorry.

12

and I love them a lot, and they made me laugh.

13

THE COURT: Well, you should be, sir.

14

And I

And

I'm very

It's just that I haven't seen my nieces and nephews,
I'm sorry.

As to Count II, it's the sentence of the Court

15

that you serve not less than one nor more than 15 years in

16

the Utah State Prison.

17

restitution made; none sought by the State.

18
19
20

No fine is imposed.

No order of

It is the order of the Court that those sentences
be —

be served consecutively, one after the other.
If you are truly honest about your desire to

21

change your life —

change the reckless nature of your

22

behavior —

23

by the Department of Corrections.

24

clean, they'll put you into a program inside the institution

25

and then work you into Fremont or Bonneville.

then you will be given the opportunity to do so
If you keep your nose
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I

1 1

1

halfway house facility is available.

2

the ball is in your court.

3

own behavior that you can work with the people up there.

4
5
6
7

Take you there. But

You decide.

That's the order of the Court.

You show by your

Go back and have a

seat.
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded.)
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That, the foregoing matter, to wit, STATE OF UTAH

8

VS. WAYNE GENE NICHOLAS, CRIMINAL NO. 911500095, was

9
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10

thereafter, to the best of my listening and understanding,

11

reduced to computerized transcription under my direction.
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I further testify that I am not interested in the
event of the action.
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APPENDIX II
State's Review of Transcript Omissions

State's Review of "Inaudible" Transcript
Problems Identified by Defendant, at Exhibit "B"
of his Brief of Appellant
(page references are to trial transcript T. 12/17/91)
No.

Page

Line

1-12 (Exh. B, appellant's brief)
13

37

14

14

43

4

15
16

44
49

6
13

17

83

13

18-19
20
21
22
23
24
25

87
88
91
108
111
118
155

9-10
2
4
17
18
7
5

26

156

18

27

157

6

28

165

14

29

171

11

30

172

25

31

180

21

32

183

8

33

187

15

34

195

6

35

218

22

Context
Jury selection and
prosecutor's opening
statement.
Problem corrected when witness
directed to answer out loud.
Describing the Williams home,
intruder's likely mode of
entry.
Describing Williams home.
Reviewing witness's prior
statement to police.
Excusing jury for discussion
outside its presence.
Evidentiary ruling by court.
Noting a defense objection.
Witness explaining an exhibit.
Witness explaining an exhibit.
Defense opening statement.
Excusing a witness.
Defendant describing his
living and job situation.
Defendant describing his
tattoo.
Defendant describing prior
acquaintance with Tonya
Williams.
Defendant describing a trip to
Mesquite ("car or truck?").
Court comment after announcing
recess.
Tonya Williams describing
intruder's position on her
bed.
Peggy Williams reviewing her
need to wear glasses.
Peggy Williams re-describing
intruder's exit from home.
Court reviewing record of
another proceeding.
Reviewing jury instructions
with counsel.
Defense closing argument.

